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Let’s Not Get Psyched Out of Privacy:   
Reflections on Withdrawing Consent to the Collection, Use and Disclosure of Personal Information 
 
Jennifer Barrigar,* Jacquelyn Burkell,** Ian Kerr*** 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The technologies that we use and the values we embrace construct an 
information hungry society. Our mass adoption of them has transformed 
many of us into information junkies, and those whose business it is to feed 
our info-pangs continuously demand quid pro quo: in order to get 
information, you must give some up.  
 
Obviously, there are serious social consequences resulting from the 
information trade.  It would not be unreasonable, therefore, to expect that 
informational privacy might attain value in this century similar to that of 
liberty in previous centuries.  To some extent, this expectation is realized: 
our ability to determine for ourselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about us is communicated to others1 has become globally 
recognized as an important aspect of personal liberty and self-
determination.2 Unfortunately, these global pronouncements are not yet well 
understood by the general public at the domestic level.  
 
In Canada, the increased need for informational privacy has been directly 
linked to our rapid adoption of information technology. Here is how Bruce 
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1 See, for example, Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1970) at 322. 
2 Privacy has historically been conceptualized as a right and has been linked with notions of dignity and 
autonomy.   In 1948, for instance, the United Nations included privacy protections as Article 12 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>. Similarly, Article 
17 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights refers to privacy. See 
<http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html>. Specific data protection regimes include: the Council of Europe's 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 
(<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm>); the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data 
(<http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html>); and Directive 
95/46 of the European Parliament (<http://www.cdt.org/privacy/eudirective/EU_Directive_.html>). 
Phillips, former Privacy Commissioner of Canada, described the advent of 
PIPEDA,3 Canada’s private sector privacy law, a few years ago:  
 
This statute, which came into effect on 1 January 2001, 
constitutes the first determined effort to place a check upon, 
and ultimately to reverse, the massive erosion of individual 
privacy rights brought about by the application of computer and 
communications technology in the commercial world.4 
 
To understand what PIPEDA aims to achieve, the Act is perhaps best 
understood from a technosocial viewpoint. Rather than viewing computer and 
communications technologies as mere instruments or things, one must 
understand such technologies as situated in the organizational, informational 
and human contexts that are required for their functioning.5 Although PIPEDA 
is often thought of as little more than a set of rules and regulations for data-
miners and digital marketers, in fact, its architecture reflects its much 
broader technosocial underpinnings. Viewed through a technosocial lens, 
PIPEDA is not simply about harnessing the speed of transmission, the 
massive storage capabilities, or the broad reach of networked computers. 
Instead, PIPEDA attempts to achieve a very delicate and complicated balance 
between the organizational, informational, economic and individual interests 
that are embedded within the broad social adoption of information 
technology.  
 
In privacy law, consent is the nexus; it is the interface between human 
beings and our increasingly automated information gathering and 
dissemination tools. Consent acts as a kind of guardian of personal 
information. Except where it is unreasonable to require or otherwise 
inappropriate to obtain,6 the knowledge and consent of an individual are 
required for the collection, use, or disclosure of her personal information.7 
Recognizing this, the current Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Jennifer 
                                                 
3 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c.5 (hereafter PIPEDA). 
4 Bruce Phillips, “Foreword” in Stephanie Perrin, Heather H. Black, David H. Flaherty and T. Murray 
Rankin, The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act:  An Annotated Guide (2001, 
Toronto, Irwin) at ix. 
5 See, for example, Saskia Everts, Gender & Technology:  Empowering Women, Engendering Development  
(London, Zed Books, 1998) at 5 and Anne Scott, "Grounded Politics: Some Thoughts on Feminist Process 
in the Information Age", ACM Computers & Society vol 31, no. 4 (December 2001) pp 5-14. 
6 PIPEDA, supra footnote 3. Principle 4.3 contains a note which purports to define some situations where 
consent may be inappropriate, but PIPEDA section 2(2) explicitly excludes the Note.  Instead, section 7 of 
PIPEDA sets out the only circumstances in which consent will be inappropriate.  This model has been 
recognized at the Federal Court level in Eastmond v. Canadian Pacific Railway 2004 FC 852 where Justice 
Lemieux wrote at paragraph 186 that:  “subsection 7(1) of the Act has given content to the words “except 
where inappropriate” found in 4.3 of the Schedule”. 
7 PIPEDA, supra footnote 3, Principle 4.3. 
Stoddart, has described consent as “the fundamental principle on which 
PIPEDA is based.”8  
 
In this article, we investigate PIPEDA’s conception of consent, with special 
emphasis on the right of individuals to withdraw consent. Not only do PIPEDA 
and similar data protection laws around the globe require consent prior to the 
collection, use, or disclosure of most personal information, we suggest that 
they set higher thresholds for obtaining consent than would be afforded by 
way of private ordering.9 Unlike the law of contracts – where consent is seen 
as a single transactional moment – PIPEDA generally allows the information 
subject to withdraw consent at any time.10 On this basis, we argue that 
PIPEDA’s consent model is best understood as providing an ongoing act of 
agency to the information subject. This notion, we suggest, is much more 
robust than the usual model for consent in private ordering, which treats 
consent as an isolated moment of contractual agreement during an 
information exchange.  
 
Although consent-as-ongoing-agency is a promising antidote to the “erosion 
of individual privacy rights brought about by the application of computer and 
communications technology in the commercial world,”11 an investigation of 
various psychological factors surrounding the decision whether to withdraw 
consent reveals that the full potential of this model may be compromised in 
practice.  This unfortunate fact is made plain through an analysis of the 
psychological barriers to withdrawing consent. Our descriptive account of 
these psychological barriers also helps to explain why people who say that 
they value their privacy often appear to act otherwise.  
 
Instead of viewing consent in isolation (and, accordingly, viewing these 
psychological considerations as stumbling blocks), PIPEDA may be read as 
providing a framework which aims to build a culture that better understands 
the importance of privacy protection.  In so doing, the power of the 
psychological factors may be addressed and the significance of consenting 
and/or withdrawing consent to the collection, use and disclosure of personal 
information made meaningful again.  
 
 
II. Contractual versus Ongoing Consent  
 
                                                 
8 Jennifer Stoddart, "An Overview of Canada’s New Private Sector Privacy Law – The Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act" (available at 
<http://www.privcom.gc.ca/speech/2004/vs/vs_sp-d_040331_e.asp>). 
9 See Ian Kerr, "If Left to their Own Devices" in Michael Geist, ed., In the Public Interest: The Future of 
Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto, Irwin Law, 2005) and Ian Kerr, "Hacking at Privacy" in Michael Geist, 
ed., Privacy Law Review (Toronto, Butterworths, 2005). 
10 “An individual may withdraw consent at any time, subject to legal or contractual restrictions and reasonable 
notice.” PIPEDA section 4.3.8 of Schedule 1. 
11 Phillips, supra, footnote 4. 
Although the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information pursuant 
to PIPEDA generally requires “knowledge and consent”,12 the notion of 
consent is nowhere defined in the Act. In its broader common law context, 
consent is often characterized as “freely given agreement.”13  More 
specifically, consent is described as: 
 
…voluntary agreement by a person in the possession and 
exercise of sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent 
choice to do something proposed by another.  It supposes a 
physical power to act, a moral power of acting, and a serious, 
determined, and free use of these powers.  Consent is implied in 
every agreement.  It is an act unclouded by fraud, duress, or 
sometimes even mistake.14 
 
Because the “voluntary agreement” aspect is so central, consent is often 
linked to the legal paradigm of contract. The notion of an agreement – 
contractual or otherwise – usually presupposes some particular aim or 
object. One never agrees in a vacuum; rather one agrees to something, or 
with something.  In private law, certainly in contract law, consent is 
understood as inherently transactional – a definable moment that occurs 
when the parties crystallize the terms and conditions upon which they agree. 
Contractual consent is determined at the moment the parties communicate 
their intention to be bound by that agreement.15 Whether executed or 
executory,16 contractual consent is expressed in an instant. Once the parties 
have achieved a consensus, the contract is in place and the obligations 
become fixed. As of the moment this happens, the question of contractual 
consent is settled. 
 
By contrast, the consent requirement set out in PIPEDA is not an 
isolated moment of agreement. Consent in PIPEDA is conceived of as 
somehow ongoing.  
 
Of course, the notion of ongoing consent is not unique to privacy.  Other 
areas of law – consent to treatment in health law, for example – regard 
consent as an ongoing process: 
    
To many in the care-giving professions, consent is nothing more 
than obtaining a patient’s signature on a “consent” form.  Such 
                                                 
12 Supra, footnote 6. See also section 7 of the Act. 
13 Dukelow, Daphne A. and Betsy Nuse, The Dictionary of Canadian Law, 2nd ed. (Scarborough, Ont, 
Carswell, 1995) at 232.  
14 Henry Campbell Black, Michael J. Connolly and Joseph R. Nolan, eds., Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed., 
(St. Paul, Minnesota, West Group Publishing, 1979) at 276. 
15 Gerald H. L. Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON, Carswell, 1999) at 
16-17 and Stephen Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 4th ed. (Toronto, Emond Montgomery 
Publications, 1999) at 66-67. 
16 An executory contract is one which has not yet been completely fulfilled by one or more of the parties: 
Gerald H. L. Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada, 3rd ed. (Scarborough, ON, Carswell, 1994) at 108. 
an impression belies the fact that consent is a “process” which 
involves a treatment relationship and effective communication 
over a period of time.  The fact that some provincial legislation 
or regulations require signed written “consents” to treatment 
does not change this fact. … [T]he signed consent form is 
nothing more than evidence of consent.  It is not the consent 
itself.17 
 
There are a number of similarities in the consent-seeking-processes in health 
law and privacy law. Both regimes require that the person consenting have 
the mental capacity and be legally competent to consent.18 Both require that 
the organization seeking consent provide adequate disclosure of the relevant 
information needed by the person choosing whether to consent.19 Both 
regimes strictly limit the scope of consent to the specified purpose or 
procedure.20 Both provide the person consenting with the opportunity to ask 
(and receive understandable answers to) questions concerning that to which 
they are consenting.21  
 
While the two systems share these basic requirements as core 
elements of the consent seeking process,22 there is also an important 
difference between the two.  Consent to treatment in a medical 
context is inherently specific, usually relating to a particular procedure 
or set of procedures. By contrast, consent under PIPEDA often has 
implications and effects which extend well beyond a specific 
transaction or series of transactions.23  
 
 
III.  Consent as an Act of Ongoing Agency 
 
To understand and appreciate the ongoing consent doctrine, one must 
recognize PIPEDA as predicated on the notion that individuals have a 
right to control personal information about themselves.  If individuals 
have such a right-of-control then, unless they surrender it,24 they 
retain ultimate control over their personal information in spite of 
                                                 
17 Lorne Rozovsky, The Canadian Law of Consent to Treatment, 2d ed. (Markham, Butterworths, 1997) at 
1. 
18 Ibid at 3. 
19 Ibid.  
20  Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Some of which will not always be resolved during the first instance of consent. 
23 It is interesting to note that Canadian medical consent law does contain an exception which makes it 
possible for a physician to extend surgery beyond the procedure authorized by the patient (Rozovsky, 
supra, footnote 17 at 17).  This is analogous to the “consistent use” provisions of Canada’s Privacy Act 
(R.S. 1985, c. P-21) as recognized in sections 9 and 11.  In contrast, the drafters of PIPEDA have not 
included such a clause, making “consistent use” inapplicable under PIPEDA. 
24 A question arises as to whether this right is alienable. See, for example, James Rule and Lawrence 
Hunter "Towards Property Rights in Personal Data" in Colin J. Bennett and Rebecca Grant, eds., Visions of 
Privacy:  Policy Choices for the Digital Age (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1999). 
consenting to its use by some organization. The consent afforded to an 
organization to use an individual’s personal information must therefore 
be understood to be restricted. Consent does not give the organization 
ultimate control over personal information in perpetuity.  
 
In other words, the continued use of an individual’s personal 
information must be understood as a necessary consequence, not of 
the initial consent to collect the information, but rather of that person’s 
continuing consent to the organization to use that information. 
Consent, for the purposes of PIPEDA, must not be thought as a 
“release” of information, nor as a complete “assignment” of control 
over the information. Rather, it is a “license” that permits some limited 
collection, use or disclosure.25 
 
Principle 4.5 also deals with the issue of retention.26  The fact that an 
organization cannot retain indefinitely is further indication of a limited 
consent, one which is linked to specific purposes.   
 
Taken altogether, this strongly suggests that information is not 
unilaterally released when consent is given, but rather that an 
individual has ongoing agency in managing her personal information. 
 
This ongoing right of control held by the individual is reinforced in law 
by the corollary requirement of ongoing consent, which is codified in 
Principle 4.3.8 of PIPEDA. This Principle permits individuals to 
withdraw consent at any time.27  This provision, in conjunction with a 
number of others mentioned above,28 is meant to place the individual 
in control of her personal information at all times, signaling that 
consent, in the privacy law context, is an ongoing act of agency. 
 
PIPEDA’s framework sets up support for this contention, especially in 
the Schedule 1 Principles.  Organizations are to be open about their 
information management practices29, presumably in order that 
individuals are able to make informed initial decisions and revisit those 
decisions when and if necessary.   
 
                                                 
25 Under PIPEDA Principle 4.2.2, consent is only given for the purposes specified.  
Under Principle 4.4 these purposes must be appropriately limited, and under Principle 4.5 
all uses or disclosures require consent and should be documented  per Principle 4.5.1.  
Almost any new purpose beyond those already specified requires new consent, as set out 
in Principle 4.2.4.   
26 PIPEDA Principle 4.5.3 states that personal information that is no longer required to fulfill the identified 
purposes should not be retained, and requires organizations to develop guidelines and implement 
procedures to govern the destruction of personal information. 
27 Subject to legal or contractual restrictions and reasonable notice. 
28 Supra, footnote 25. 
29 PIPEDA Principle 4.8. 
The ability to withdraw consent is only one of the possible responses 
open to an individual as she manages her personal information  -
individuals have a right of access to their personal information30 and a 
corresponding right to challenge the accuracy or completeness of that 
information.   
 
Finally, individuals have the power to challenge an organization’s 
compliance with the requirements of PIPEDA,31 both via a complaint to 
the Privacy Commissioner32 and, if necessary, by proceeding to Federal 
Court after the Privacy Commisisoner releases a report of her findings 
in the matter.33 
 
IV. Psychological Barriers to Withdrawing Consent 
 
In response to the claim that individuals have a right to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent personal information is 
communicated to others, a number of critics have complained that most 
people don’t seem to care all that much about this right.34 These critics say 
that when you look at how people behave, it seems that many if not most do 
not truly value the right to control their personal information. People seem 
willing to hand over their personal information in exchange for benefits as 
trivial as the possibility of winning a toaster, and few ever exercise the right 
to withdraw consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of personal 
information.35   
 
This behaviour is inconsistent with expressed privacy values36 and there is 
value in exploring whether and why people rarely exercise their right to 
withdraw consent to the collection, use, and disclosure. Such an 
investigation, thus far absent in the Canadian privacy law and policy 
literature, is important because a systemic failure to exercise the right to 
withdraw consent reduces the consent principle to little more than the 
transactional moment of private ordering, rendering PIPEDA’s new, robust, 
ongoing consent practically worthless.  Ongoing consent requires the exercise 
of agency in granting, modifying, reconsidering and withdrawing consent in 
response to changing circumstances.   
 
                                                 
30 PIPEDA Principle 4.9. and section 8 of the Act. 
31 PIPEDA Principle 4.10. 
32 PIPEDA Section 12. 
33 PIPEDA Section 14. 
34 Acquisti, A. and Grossklags, J. (2004). "Privacy attitudes and privacy behavior", in J. Camp and S.R. 
Lewis, eds., The Economics of Information Security: Advances in Information Security, Volume 12, 65-
178, (Norwell, Massachussets, Kluwer, 2004).. 
35 As Oracle C.E.O. Larry Ellison famously said, “Well, this privacy you're concerned about is largely an 
illusion. All you have to give up is your illusions, not any of your privacy.” (Interview with anchor Hank 
Plante of KPIX-TV, a San Francisco TV station, on September 21, 2001.) 
36 See for example Ekos Research Associates Privacy Revealed:  The Canadian Privacy Survey(1993) 
(Ottawa, Ontario) 10. 
So, why do people who have consented to an organization’s demand for 
personal information generally refuse to review, revise or withdraw their 
consent? Let’s consider a typical example involving a hypothetical individual 
named Jij. 
 
Recently, Jij visited the Toronto Star website to read an article recommended 
by a friend. From the title, it appeared that the article was interesting and 
relevant, and the website offered immediate and “free” access – with one 
catch: in order to read the article, Jij had to register as a user. By 
registering, Jij permitted the Toronto Star to collect and use a variety of 
personal information. Jij knows this but, in the moment, her desire to read 
the article outweighed her concern about information privacy, so she 
completed the registration process and thus agreed to the collection and use 
of her personal information without even trying to understand the 
implications of doing so. Having a basic understanding of privacy law, Jij did 
so knowing that she could, at any time, withdraw her consent.  
 
But will she?  
 
Much will depend on a number of psychological factors that influence the way 
that Jij makes a decision about whether to withdraw consent. Our analysis 
suggests that these factors work in concert, resulting in a circumstance 
already well-known to marketers: namely, that consent, once given, is 
unlikely to be withdrawn.37  
 
Jij likes to think of herself as a consistent person, someone who makes 
careful and considered decisions that take into account her values and 
preferences. Yet Jij just acted in a way that is inconsistent with her own 
values -- she has freely consented to a sweeping collection and use of 
personal information in return for a relatively small reward. She is not alone 
in this either. According to a recent PEW survey, 60% of all Americans are 
“very concerned” about privacy, while at the same time 54% have shared 
personal information in order to get access to a Web site, and an additional 
10% are willing to provide this information if asked.38 Thus, at least one 
quarter of those surveyed have acted or are prepared to act with 
inconsistency similar to Jij’s, releasing personal information for relatively 
small or nonexistent rewards seemingly despite significant concerns about 
their own privacy.  
 
                                                 
37 Opt-out protocols (where consent is assumed unless explicitly withdrawn) lead to greater rates of consent 
than do opt-in protocols (where the default is no consent).  See E. J. Johnson, S. Bellman, and G. L. Lohse 
"Defaults, Framing, and Privacy: Why Opting in ≠ Opting Out, (2002), Marketing Letters, 13(1), 5-15. 
38 S. Fox, L. Rainie, J. Horrigan, A. Lenhart, T. Spooner and C. Carter, "Trust and privacy online: Why 
Americans want to rewrite the rules" (2000), The PEW Internet and American Life Project, available at 
<http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Trust_Privacy_Report.pdf>. 
Such inconsistency can be uncomfortable, and psychologists have a name for 
this discomfort: cognitive dissonance.39 According to the theory of cognitive 
dissonance, inconsistent beliefs or beliefs that are inconsistent with actions 
can give rise to an uncomfortable psychological state. The above example 
has all the hallmarks of a situation that will trigger cognitive dissonance40: (i) 
Jij feels personally responsible for her own decision to consent and thus 
cannot blame her actions on someone or something else; (ii) Jij understands 
that, as a direct result of her decision, her privacy, which is something she 
values, has been compromised; (iii) the justification for her decision is 
relatively weak, since she could, with relatively little effort, have accessed 
the article through other means; and (iv) she has clearly made a free choice 
to release her personal information.41   
 
Psychological research has demonstrated that people tend to resolve 
cognitive dissonance through one of three mechanisms.42 One possibility is to 
trivialize some of the competing cognitions.43 In the current situation, this 
could translate into Jij convincing herself either that the privacy violation in 
this case is not important, or that privacy itself is overvalued.  
 
Another possibility is to seek selectively information consistent with her 
decision. In the realm of consumption, this translates into selective attention 
to positive product information regarding a chosen alternative.44 In this case, 
Jij could seek and attend to information suggesting that the collection and 
use of personal information by the Toronto Star does not constitute a privacy 
violation, since the Toronto Star has a privacy policy and therefore must be 
privacy compliant.45  
 
The third mode of dissonance reduction is change of attitude, opinion, or 
behaviour.46 Jij could, for example, modify her attitude about information 
privacy so that she considers privacy to be less important, or she could 
                                                 
39 See L. Festinger, A theory of cognitive dissonance (Palo Alto, CA, Stanford University Press, 1957) and 
L. Festinger, Conflict, decision, and dissonance (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1964). 
40 J. Cooper and R. H. Fazio, "A new look at dissonance" (2004), Advances in experimental social 
psychology 17, at pp. 227-266. 
41 E. Harmon-Jones, J. W. Brehm, J. Greenberg, L. Simon and D. E. Nelson, "Evidence that the production 
of aversive consequences is not necessary to create cognitive dissonance" (1996), Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 70(1), pp. 5-16. 
42 J. W. Brehm and A.R. Cohen, Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance (New York, Wiley, 1962).  See also 
Festinger supra, footnote 39. 
43 L. Simon, J.Greenberg and J. Brehm, "Trivialization: The forgotten mode of dissonance reduction" 
(1995), Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, pp. 247-260. 
44 D. Ehrlich, I. Guttman, P. Schonbach and J. Mills, "Postdecision exposure to relevant information" 
(1951), Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 54, pp. 98-102. 
45 Jacquelyn Burkell and Valerie Steeves, "Privacy Policies on Kids’ Favourite Web Sites", Presented at the 
6th Annual Privacy and Security Workshop, Privacy and Security: Disclosure, University of Toronto on 
November 3, 2005. available at <http://idtrail.org/content/blogcategory/21/72/>.   
46 A. Elliot and P. Devine, "On the motivational nature of cognitive dissonance as psychological 
discomfort" (1994), Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67, pp. 382-394. 
perhaps place less value on her privacy with regard to the particular 
information that she has disclosed to the Toronto Star.    
 
Each of these resolutions would address Jij’s current state of psychological 
discomfort; at the same time, however, each reduces the likelihood that Jij 
will later withdraw her consent. In fact, once she has successfully resolved 
the dissonance there is little reason for her to go back and revisit her original 
consent: after all, she now perceives that decision as consistent with the only 
value that would lead her to revoke it (that is, her valuing of privacy). This is 
not to say that she couldn’t withdraw her consent. She could. However, the 
principle of cognitive dissonance suggests that she may not be motivated to 
do so.  
 
There are other aspects of the situation that could have the same effect; 
aspects that will tend to bias decisions against withdrawing consent. These 
arise from what is, essentially, a re-weighting of the gains and losses 
associated with consent. This re-weighting occurs once the initial decision 
has been made, and arises as a direct result of the decision itself.  
 
Typically, an individual considering initial consent is weighing the subjective 
value of an immediate gain (e.g., of access to the Toronto Star), against the 
subjective value of a less salient loss of control over personal information, 
with ramifications that, though significant, are less immediate. In contrast, 
withdrawing consent typically results in an immediate loss (e.g., the loss of 
access to the Toronto Star), and the gain of the relatively distant, ephemeral, 
and potentially partially illusory benefit of control over her personal 
information.47  
 
In addition to bringing to an end the permission given to an organization to 
collect, use, or disclose personal information, sometimes the practical effect 
of withdrawing consent is to reverse the benefits and burdens that coincided 
with the conferral of the original consent: much of what is lost in consent is 
gained in withdrawal, as is much of what is gained in consent lost in 
withdrawal.48 There are, however, at least two reasons to think that the 
relative value of these gains and losses will change after an initial decision to 
consent: specifically, that the subjective value of consent will actually 
become greater once the initial consent has been offered.   
 
First, according to prospect theory49, decisions are made in a context where 
losses loom larger than gains, and where outcomes are evaluated against an 
                                                 
47 The benefit could be partially illusory if her information has already been provided, with consent, to a 
third party. 
48 Strictly speaking, this is not always the case. To continue our example from above, Jij may have read a 
number of articles in exchange for consent to collect, use, or disclose her personal information. Upon her 
withdrawal of consent, she will likely lose the ability to access articles in the future. But removing access 
does not put her back in her initial situation since that will not undo what she has already read.  
49 D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, "Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk" (1979), 
Econometrica, 47(2), pp. 263-291. 
anchor point, or implicit comparator. If the decision under consideration is 
whether to offer consent in the first place, the most salient effect is a gain: 
right now Jij doesn’t have access to the information she wants, and by 
consenting she would gain that access. By contrast, if her decision were to 
withdraw consent, it is likely that the most salient outcome is a loss: loss of 
access to information.  Prospect theory states that losses are weighted more 
heavily in decision making than are gains. By extension, the negative value 
of loss of access when consent is withdrawn would be greater than the 
positive value of access gained when consent is offered. In the literature on 
decision making, this has also been called the endowment effect, and is 
reflected in the tendency to value an object more when one owns it.50  
 
It is also important to consider when (and to some extent, whether) Jij 
experiences the benefits and losses associated with her decisions about 
consent. When making her initial decision, Jij is in some sense weighing an 
immediate benefit (being able to read the article) against a loss of 
information privacy whose effects are at some remove, both temporally and 
in terms of overall salience. In contrast, a decision to withdraw consent 
involves a comparison between an immediate loss (the loss of access) and a 
distant and ephemeral benefit (the benefit of regaining control of her 
information). It is well known in decision theory51 that subjective utility – 
that is, the personal value of an outcome – changes depending on when the 
outcome will be experienced. In particular, the subjective value of a benefit 
or loss that Jij receives today is greater than the current subjective value of 
that same benefit or loss if it is to be received some time in the future. While 
the exact form of this discounting function is subject of much debate,52 the 
existence of discounting is universally accepted.  
 
The literature on decision making also suggests that discounts are generally 
greater for gains than for losses.53 Thus, both gains and losses lose value as 
they are moved into the future: gains are perceived as less “good” and losses 
less “bad” – but the rate of change is faster for gains than for losses. When 
Jij considers the decision to withdraw consent, the loss (of access to the 
articles she wishes to read) is immediate; the gain, however, is not. To the 
extent that she sees the gain as something that will be realized in the future, 
its value is reduced – and the effect is all the greater because it is a gain that 
is distant in time, rather than a loss.  
 
What are the implications of prospect theory and discounted utility for 
decisions regarding the withdrawal of consent? Suppose that the initial 
                                                 
50 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler, "Experimental Tests of the Endowment 
Effect and the Coase Theorem" (1990), Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), pp. 1325-48. 
51 G.F. Loewenstein and J. Elster, Choice over time (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1992). 
52 U. Benzion, Y. Schachmurove and J. Yagil, "Subjective discount functions: An experimental approach" 
(2004), Applied Financial Economics 14(5), 299-311. 
53 See for example M. Ortendahl and J. F. Fries, "Time-related issues with application to health gains and 
losses" (2002), Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 55, pp. 843-848, and R. H. Thaler, "Some empirical 
evidence on dynamic inconsistency" (1981), Economic Letters, 8, pp. 201-207. 
decision to grant consent was a difficult one, because at that point the 
balance of gains and losses only weakly supported Jij’s decision. If nothing 
else in the situation has changed, how does that initial consent change the 
balance of gains and losses? Initially, the gain was most salient and 
immediate, and the loss less salient and only to be experienced in the future. 
Now, however, the opposite holds. Given that losses weigh more heavily than 
gains, and given that gains are discounted at a greater rate than losses, all 
else being equal, the value associated with the withdrawal of consent will 
actually be greater than the subjective value of the initial consent. What is 
the result? Jij anticipates that if she withdraws her consent, she will actually 
feel worse off than she did before she offered it in the first place. Once again, 
the psychological factors at play make it less likely that Jij will withdraw 
consent.  
 
Cognitive dissonance, prospect theory, and discounted subjective utility have 
been shown to apply to decision making in a wide variety of contexts.54 
Together, these theories predict a variety of decision biases, including a 
normatively irrational preference for the status quo55  and the sunk cost 
effect.56 The application of the relevant theories to the doctrine of ongoing 
consent is somewhat novel, but the extensions are natural, and there is no 
reason to think that these well-established decision biases are inapplicable to 
decisions about withdrawing consent.  
 
Acquisti and Grossklags have argued that “we need to incorporate more 
accurate models of users’ behavior into the formulation of both policy and 
technology”.57 We share this point of view. The psychological theories 
discussed above have obvious relevance for the principle of ongoing consent, 
and suggest important policy considerations that should be taken into 
account in the development and implementation of this doctrine.  
 
The implications for ongoing consent are clear: the decision biases described 
above will each tend to reduce the likelihood that consent, once offered, will 
be withdrawn. This discussion throws into sharp belief what is perhaps the 
most critical point. It is difficult to disabuse decision makers of the biases 
and heuristics that influence decision making. Consequently, one cannot 
expect that individuals who are not properly educated about the implications 
of consenting to the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information will 
recognize let alone remedy their tendency to “stick with” an initial consent. 
 
V. Not Stumbling Blocks, but Building Blocks 
 
                                                 
54 C. Camerer, “Prospect Theory in the Wild”, in D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, eds., Choices, Values and 
Frames (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) at pp. 288-300. 
55 Reflected in the endowment effect as described above. 
56 A tendency to ‘throw good money after bad’, pursuing a course of action even if it appears that the 
investment is not going to pay off. 
57 Supra, footnote 34 at 176.  
As indicated in the section above, behavioural considerations can be 
understood as “barriers” to the meaningful withdrawal of consent. However, 
PIPEDA’s new approach to consent strives to accommodate these features of 
our psychology within the legislative framework, and to make of them not 
stumbling blocks but building blocks.   
 
Consider, for instance, the tendency of individuals to trivialize the value of 
privacy in order to reduce their own psychological discomfort that arises from 
their consent to the release of private information. PIPEDA has some ability 
to respond to this. In fact, the role of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
was designed (in part) to counter such tendencies. Pursuant to section 24 of 
PIPEDA, the Privacy Commissioner has a legal duty to foster public 
understanding and valuation of privacy.  It is fair to say that this is in fact an 
overarching goal of PIPEDA. The legislative schema actually requires the 
Commissioner to educate and encourage organizations to develop detailed 
privacy policies and practices. It also affords the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada an educational mandate that goes well beyond the 
mere investigation of privacy complaints, promoting the development of a 
privacy-valuing and privacy-protecting culture. Among other things, the 
current Commissioner has promulgated these aspects of her mandate 
through a “contributions program”58 and regular involvement in academic 
fora, such as the one that gave rise to this series of published articles.  One 
of the intended effects of these activities is to encourage a broad 
understanding of the importance of privacy. 
 
These activities could be significant, especially when one considers that 
individuals often respond to dissonance by diminishing the perceived 
importance of a particular privacy violation.59  Where the focus is on the 
violation itself, it is easy to understand how the strategy of diminishing the 
importance of that violation might act to address dissonance. Recall, 
however, that PIPEDA is premised on the more general right of an individual 
to control personal information about herself.  Given that the cultural and 
regulatory focus is predicated on personal autonomy and the importance of 
personal control, there is good reason to expect that such a schema, if it 
stipulated, promoted and actually enforced higher thresholds for consent, 
could have a transformative effect on the manner in which people perceive 
the importance of privacy-as-personal-control and consent-as-ongoing-
agency.60   
                                                 
58 Available at <http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/cp/index_e.asp>. 
59 Consequently, it is suggested that the Privacy Commissioner’s mandate is not merely to educate and 
encourage the valuation of privacy but to facilitate a change in the way that people perceive their own 
decisions about privacy.  
60 One could draw parallels here to a suggested approach for the Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S.C. 1985, 
c. H-6). In a recent report of the Canadian Human Rights Act Review Panel, the authors recommend that 
the language of the Act's purpose clause and of the Act itself be changed in order to emphasize substantive 
equality – the notion that its provisions are not merely “special” protections created by the Act but ought 
rather to be understood as actualizations of full equality. See 
<http://canada.justice.gc.ca/chra/en/chrareview_report_2000.pdf> at p. 11. 
 
Altering people’s perceptions away from the orientation of marketers might 
emasculate the negative effects characterized by prospect theory as well.  If 
perceived losses loom larger than gains, then it matters a great deal how 
people understand the gains and losses that result from exchanges of their 
personal information - the  manner in which information exchanges are 
structured and understood could effectively determine the decisions people 
make about initial consent and about whether to withdraw consent.  
 
Rather than the marketers emphasis on “FREE access to” or “FREE 
registration for” information products, if, instead, people became focused on 
the right to control personal information and the importance of maintaining 
that right, the loss of personal control could more easily be perceived as 
outweighing the benefits of access to information or services received in 
exchange. It might even result in different kinds of bargains. For example, if 
people understood the potentially grave implications of surrendering control 
over their personal information, as the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has 
recently been forced to confront,61 they might actually prefer paying a small 
subscription fee for the information product instead of surrendering control of 
their personal information; they might rather pay for flights or “gifts” instead 
of trading away the right of control over their personal data. There is also a 
much greater likelihood that people would more carefully consider what it 
means to consent and/or withdraw consent to the collection, use and 
disclosure of personal information. Currently, people share a general 
impression that consent to the use of personal information is an all-or-
nothing, take-it-or-leave-it, instantaneous transaction; an offer that they 
cannot refuse 
 
In addition to its potential ability to remedy the effects of dissonance and 
prospect theory, PIPEDA seeks to assist in addressing the difficulties imposed 
by “discounted subjective utility,” i.e., situations where it is perceived that 
continued consent tends to trump the subjective value of initial consent.  
PIPEDA requires that individuals be made aware of any changes to the 
informational situation that gave rise to the initial consent and that unless 
the change is required by law, a new consent be received.62  By forcing 
organizations to provide notice of collection or to identify new uses of 
personal information, individuals receiving such notice are displaced from the 
comfort of their initial position and confronted with the decision whether or 
not to consent to a secondary use of their personal information.  Similarly, by 
implementing an ability to withdraw consent at any time, individuals are 
provided with the opportunity to become the agents of their own 
informational destiny. 
 
                                                 
61  Maclean's magazine recently reported that it was able to purchase the Privacy Commissioner of Canada's 
personal phone records from an American data broker. See 
<http://www.macleans.ca/topstories/canada/article.jsp?content=20051121_115779_115779>. 
62 PIPEDA Principle 4.2.4.  
But will the mere fact of these remedial possibilities built-in to PIPEDA 
actually ensure that individuals achieve this sort of informational agency?  It 
is highly unlikely. Our intention here is certainly not to suggest that the mere 
enactment of PIPEDA is somehow sufficient to create a new cultural approach 
to the issue of consent and its role in informational privacy. Far from it.  
 
That said, it does seem plausible that PIPEDA could be an important first step 
toward the development of such a culture.  Viewing PIPEDA holistically, we 
are struck by the way the Commissioner’s public education mandate maps 
onto the philosophical positioning of the individual as the axis of control over 
the collection, use and disclosure of personal information. An understanding 
of consent as an ongoing act of agency would be consistent with this 
approach and would provide a fulcrum for understanding privacy as more 
than mere data protection.  
 
Understanding and valuing consent as an ongoing act of agency would 
require that organizations, and not just individuals, revise many of their 
current practices and policies.  Unfortunately, most organizations continue to 
treat consent as a transactional moment, using standard form clickwrap 
agreements as a means of obtaining overarching “consents” for any/all 
potential uses and disclosures of personal information. This archaic, freedom-
to-contract mentality fails to recognize the higher threshold assigned to 
consent in a privacy law context63 and also fails to recognize the role that 
consent is meant to play as the nexus between people and information 
technology.   
 
 
VI.   Conclusion 
 
In this article, we have tried to articulate why the transactional approach to 
consent is the wrong approach in the privacy context through an examination 
of how the psychological barriers to withdrawing consent to the collection, 
use, and disclosure of personal information can actually help to inform a 
more robust approach to privacy protection in general and to the notion of 
consent as an act of ongoing agency in particular. Although there have been 
a number of recent complaints about the limitations of PIPEDA64 as a result 
of the compromises that were made during its enactment,65 the Act does 
                                                 
63 For an articulation of this thesis in the context of consent to the collection of personal information in the 
context of digital rights management, see I. Kerr, "If Left to their Own Devices", supra, footnote 9 and I. 
Kerr, "Hacking at Privacy", supra, footnote 9. 
64 Michael Geist, for example, has criticized the ombuds approach to the enforcement of PIPEDA, arguing 
that the Privacy Commissioner's inability to issue binding decisions means that there is insufficient 
incentive for companies to comply. See 
<http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article
&cid=1098655810217&call_pageid=971794782442&col=971886476975&DPL=IvsNDS%2f7ChAX&tac
odalogin=yes>. For other examples, see the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic's report on 
PIPEDA at <http://www.cippic.ca/en/action-items/pl_article_for_cplr_july_2005.pdf>. 
65 The recognition of the need for PIPEDA sprung (at least in part) from concern about maintaining and 
facilitating Canada’s international trading relationship. It was enacted under the federal trade and 
inspire the inculcation of a better understanding of privacy and its 
importance in society. As we move towards the statutory review of PIPEDA,66 
it is time to start thinking more deeply about what further improvements and 
what additional institutions will be required to bring about the vision that 
PIPEDA contemplates.   
                                                                                                                                                 
commerce power, and it focuses primarily on commercial activities. The CSA Model Code for the 
Protection of Personal Information which forms Schedule 1 of the Act was the result of a process in which 
business was intimately involved.  See Christopher Berzins, “Protecting Personal Information in Canada’s 
Private Sector :  The Price of Consensus Building” (2002) 27 Queen’s L.J. 609 at 623 for a discussion of 
these tensions.   
66 To be held early in 2006, five years after its introduction, as required by s.29 of PIPEDA. 
